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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 15-2383 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
CALEB PARSONS, 
                                 Appellant 
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Crim. No. 2-12-cr-00399-005) 
District Judge:  Honorable J. Curtis Joyner 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 15, 2016 
____________ 
 
Before: FUENTES, SHWARTZ and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: September 8, 2016) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
*   This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 
 Caleb Parsons appeals his sentence of 160 months’ imprisonment for conspiracy, 
dealing in firearms without a license, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.  
His court-appointed attorney has moved to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 
U.S. 738 (1967), and Parsons has filed a brief in which he asks us to “[a]ffirm the 
conviction and REMAND for resentencing with instructions to apply § 3E1.1 [acceptance 
of responsibility] and remove the point used to enhance the offense category pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(1) and (2).”  (Informal Brief (“pro se brief”) at 5.)  In an unusual 
twist, the Government has conceded that, as Parsons argues in his pro se brief, remand for 
resentencing is appropriate due to plain error in the calculation of his Guidelines range.  
For the reasons that follow, we will grant Parsons the relief he seeks as to § 4A1.2, relief 
that the Government agrees is appropriate:  we will affirm the conviction, vacate Parsons’ 
sentence, and remand for resentencing.     
I. 
 In 2014, Parsons pleaded guilty to charges related to the illegal sale and possession 
of firearms, pursuant to a plea agreement.  At sentencing, he argued that a 2006 
disorderly conduct offense, included in the summary of his criminal history in the 
Presentence Investigation Report, should not be counted for purposes of computing his 
criminal history category, because—and only because—he did not commit the offense.  
The District Court determined that the claimed conviction was supported by 
documentation, however, and one criminal history point associated with this conviction 
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was included in the Guidelines calculation.  The Court calculated Parsons’ Guidelines 
range to be 140 to 175 months, which reflected a total offense level of 29 (including no 
reduction for acceptance of responsibility), and Criminal History Category V.  The Court 
sentenced Parsons to a total term of incarceration of 160 months.   
 On appeal, Parsons’ counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders.  Although counsel 
made note of the disputed disorderly conduct offense in two footnotes (see Anders Br. at 
9-10 n.2, n.3), the brief indicated that there were no non-frivolous issues for appeal 
because the sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable and there were no 
valid grounds to challenge the Government’s refusal to file a motion pursuant to § 5K1.1, 
a downward departure based on cooperation.  Parsons, as noted, filed a pro se brief, 
arguing that he should have received a reduction in offense level for acceptance of 
responsibility, and that, under § 4A1.2(c) of the Guidelines, the disorderly conduct 
offense should not have been used in the calculation of his criminal history category 
because he did not receive a sentence of 30 or more days of imprisonment or one year of 
probation. 
 In its brief in response, the Government argued that counsel’s argument regarding 
its failure to file a § 5K1.1 motion, and Parsons’ argument with respect to acceptance of 
responsibility, were frivolous, and that, in any event, the § 3E1.1 argument was barred by 
the appellate waiver in Parsons’ plea agreement.  The Government acknowledged, 
however, that, as Parsons argued, the District Court committed procedural error when it 
assigned one criminal history point to the 2006 disorderly conduct conviction.  Although 
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Parsons’ appellate waiver would ordinarily preclude our review of that issue, and 
although he had not raised this specific objection at sentencing, the Government 
conceded that the Court’s error was plain, and indicated that it “does not seek to enforce 
the waiver with respect to this issue, as the error affected Parsons’ substantial rights.”  
(Gov’t Br. at 25.)  The Government asked that we affirm Parsons’ conviction, enforce the 
appellate waiver with respect to Parsons’ acceptance of responsibility argument, and 
remand for resentencing without application of the criminal history point for the 
disorderly conduct conviction. 
II.1 
 In Anders, the Supreme Court emphasized that “[Counsel’s] role as advocate 
requires that he support his client’s appeal to the best of his ability.”  386 U.S. at 744.  An 
attorney may seek permission to withdraw if he finds a case to be “wholly frivolous” 
after a “conscientious examination” of the record; such request must, however, “be 
accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the 
appeal.”  Id.  If the court agrees that the case is wholly frivolous, “it may grant counsel’s 
request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal,” but, “[o]n the other hand, if it finds any of 
the legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous) it must, prior to 
decision, afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.”  Id.   
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  We exercise plenary review to 
determine whether there are any non-frivolous issues for appeal.  Penson v. Ohio, 488 
U.S. 75, 80 (1988). 
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 In reviewing an Anders brief, we inquire as to “(1) whether counsel adequately 
fulfilled the rule’s requirements; and (2) whether an independent review of the record 
presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 
2001).  “[W]e will reject briefs . . . in which counsel argue the purportedly frivolous 
issues aggressively without explaining the faults in the arguments, as well as those where 
we are not satisfied that counsel adequately attempted to uncover the best arguments for 
his or her client.”  United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 781 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 In this case, counsel’s brief was, at least technically, inadequate under Anders.  
Although counsel listed the issue of “[i]nterpretation and application” of § 4A1.2(c)(1) in 
his statement of issues, he addressed the issue only in two footnotes that fail to explain 
why it was frivolous.  (See Anders Br. at 9-10 n.2, n.3.)  He likewise devoted only one 
sentence to the denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the second issue 
raised by Parsons in his pro se brief.  (See id. at 19.)  Simply stated, counsel failed to 
meaningfully deal with the two issues later raised by Parsons, such that we can be assured 
that he has considered them and found them “patently without merit,” see Marvin, 211 
F.3d at 781; indeed, the Government itself acknowledges that a non-frivolous issue 
exists. 
 Parsons’ argument with respect to § 4A1.2(c) is, as the Government recognizes, 
non-frivolous.  Section 4A1.2(c) provides that certain sentences, including sentences for a 
disorderly conduct offense, are included in the criminal history calculation only if “the 
sentence was a term of probation of more than one year or a term of imprisonment of at 
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least thirty days” or if the prior offense was “similar to an instant offense.”  Here, 
according to the PSR, Parsons’ 2006 disorderly conduct offense resulted in no 
punishment beyond the payment of fines and costs, and it is not similar to the instant 
firearms offenses.  See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. n. 12(A).  As the Government, to its credit, 
recognizes, this offense was erroneously counted, and the additional criminal history 
point bumped Parsons up into Criminal History Category V, resulting in a Guidelines 
range of 140 to 175 months.  Had Parsons correctly been placed in Category IV, his 
Guidelines range would have been 121 to 151 months.  His sentence, a total of 160 
months’ imprisonment, could well have been lower had the Court calculated the correct 
Guidelines range. 
 Ordinarily, when a panel of our Court finds arguable merit to an appeal or that an 
Anders brief is inadequate, we will appoint substitute counsel and order supplemental 
briefing.  See Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a).  This is not an ordinary case.  Here, no one, 
including defense counsel in his effort to comply with the strictures of Anders, even 
obliquely refers to any potential issue as to the conviction itself.  No one raises any issue 
other than to the sentence that was imposed, and no one seeks other than a resentencing, 
much less a new direct appeal.  (See Pro Se Br. at 5 (requesting that we “Affirm the 
conviction and REMAND for resentencing . . . .”); Gov’t Br. at 17 (“The government . . . 
agrees with the appellant that the district court committed an error in the sentencing 
calculation that should be corrected on remand.”).)   
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III. 
 We will affirm the conviction, vacate Parsons’ sentence, and remand for 
resentencing without the criminal history point incorrectly applied and for the District 
Court to consider, if proffered, other reasons as to why a particular sentence should be 
imposed.  We will deny counsel’s motion to withdraw without prejudice to any 
application being made to the District Court for new counsel (or to withdraw) for 
purposes of the resentencing proceeding.   
